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Abstract  
In this paper, we show a model with one-sided endogenous match efficiency. It is 
assumed that schooling can enhance match efficiency, and people will choose the 
schooling level optimally to balance its costs and benefits of enhanced match 
efficiency. Assuming a financial market imperfection which limits individuals to 
borrow, we showed that, in equilibrium, when educational achievements can be 
characterised by dicohotomy (secondary vs. tertiary), tertiary education gives higher 
wages even it only has pure match efficiency (signalling) value with no human 
capital value. We also showed that relative match efficiency vis-a-vis its mean 
matters in wage levels. 
 
 
Heterogenous match eciencyx
Seiro Itoz
1 Introduction
In South Africa, it is casually observed that many individuals do not know where to search for
the jobs. In the qualitative interviews undertaken by one of the authors, some respondents in low
income areas reveal that they do not make use of the job creation centres nor employment agencies,
they do not plan ahead to enquire about the job opening over the phone, but they simply go to the
workplace and enquire directly. Majority of low income individuals cannot aord the internet usage,
so they do not search over the web.*1 The most cost-eective, active search method can be newspaper
advertisement, which may be subject to a limited employer base. Many individuals rely on word of
mouth to get the job opening information. The quality of job information through word of mouth
then may depend on the size and quality of network characterised by weak ties (Granovetter, 1983,
2005), which may be positively correlated with job searcher’s own wealth levels.
This points to the questions of search eciency impacts on labour market outcomes. A job search
can be strategised to increase the rate of job match. A capacity to strategise may depend on school-
ing. First, strategisation requires careful thinking and planning, and schools are meant to capacitate
the students in doing so. Second, alum networks of top schools can be of high quality due to its size
and informational contents. The better your school friends do, the better your chances of getting the
information will be.
We consider a model with heterogenous search eciency in an equilibrium search framework
of Pissarides (1985). The model treates “educational investments” (signal) as search eciency. It
derives steady state unemployment and vacancy under heterogeneity. The educational investments
are assumed to carry no human capital value, and are optimally chosen by balancing the current
costs and future benefits. Heterogeneity is introduced by heterogenous marginal costs of educational
investments. In the search equilibrium, we naturaly see the job matching rate is greater with a greater
x This paper was written when Seiro Ito visited the Faculty of Managerial and Economic Sciences, Stellenbosch Uni-
veristy. He would like to thank deeply for their hospitality and the opportunities provided.
z IDE, Chiba, Japan. seiroi@gmail.com
*1 Not using phones and internet may sound irrational, but their non-use makes a perfect sense, given the price plans
and complexity of services oered. In February 2015, with a leading carrier, data costs about monthly R.29 for 100
Mb (but pay a prohibitive, a seven times higher rate of R.2 per Mb after using 100 Mb allocation), so it is not just
expensive but also tremendously dicult for low income earners to plan the megabytes and use, even if you have a
smart phone. A phone call costs R. 1.20 per minute, so it is about 4.8 times of cashier minimum wage (R.14.98 per
hour) per minute. Phone calls, too, are expensive for low income earners.
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value of educational investments.
Greater values of educational investments e can be considered to lead to a labour market advantage
beyond traditional signaling function: More accurate revealation of individual traits. This is assumed
to be achieved through better presentation skills and acquiring access to a better quality network
which transmits information more eciently and precisely. If e1 > e2, job matching rate is higher
for individual 1 than individual 2.
Inspired by Acemoglu (2001); Navarro (2007), the model treats heterogenous individuals but do
not assume sector specific employability. In fact, there is only one sector in the economy.
2 Setup
2.1 Standard matching
Under the standard matching, it is assumed that an individual spends a unit time to search the jobs
when unemployed, but not during employed. So the total number of job searchers in an economy is
the number of unemployed uL where L is population size. There are vL vacancies in the economy.
The employers and job searchers meet and examine the match of traits between individuals have
and jobs require. The match of traits is “produced” in a production function-like process called a
matching function. Following the previous works, the matching function is assumed to take argu-
ments of u; v, and is homogenous of degree 1. The number of job matches x with the people under
unemployment uL and vacancies vL is given by x(uL; vL). We normalize the population size L to 1.
Then x is considered as the rate of job match per individual given unemployment rate u and vacancy
rate v:
x = x˜(u; v) = x˜

u
v ; 1

v = x˜

 1; 1

v def= q˜()v; (1)
where

def
= vu ; q˜
0 < 0:
Match arrival rates for vacancy position and the unemployed are expressed as:
x˜
v = q˜();
x˜
u =
v
u
x˜
v = q˜(): (2)
2.2 Match efficiency
The above matching function has a microeconomic basis known as urn-ball matching (Petrongolo
and Pissarides, 2001). Assuming that a vacancy is public knowledge and each unemployed sends
one application, the probability that a vacancy receives at least one application is 1  (1  1vL )uL. Then
the number of match is given by multiplying with total number of vacancies, or vLf1   (1   1vL )uLg.
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Taking L ! 1 while holding u; v fixed, (1   1vL )uL approaches to exp

u
v

. Hence urn-ball matching
function has a form
X(uL; vL) = vL
n
1   exp

u
v
o
:
This function is homogenous of degree one. One way to define the eciency in matching, from the
job searcher’s point of view, is to make vacancies vL variable. We can assume that the matching
can incoporate eciency by introducing e 2 [1;1) to be multiplied with the number of vancancies,
giving evL. Then we have:
eX(uL; vL) = evL
n
1   exp

u
v
o
;
or its proportion form:
eX(uL; vL)
L
def
= ex(u; v) = ev
n
1   exp

u
v
o
: (3)
We see that x(u; v) is homogeneous of degree one, so is ex(u; v).
2.3 Individuals
An individual is forward looking, infinitely lived, and maximizes the lifetime utility by choosing
the labour market status and by choosing the education levels in childhood. An individual is assumed
to be risk neutral, and invests in schooling e in childhood (time 0) to enhance the matching eciency.
In childhood, there is no consumption but there is a nonpecuninary cost for education.
After invested in e, an individual will search for the job and receives an oer if a firm decides to
do so. An individual decides whether to accept the job. An individual will accept the oer only if it
increases the expected lifetime utility. After observing the match, the matched individual and firm
will enter a generalized Nash-bargaining process where the threat points are unemployment and no
production, respectively. The bargaining power for an individual is assumed to be unique and fixed
at  2 (0; 1).
The individuals receive the unemployment benefits b > 0 during unemployment, and firms will
receive nothing if not producing. In each period, there is a fixed chance s 2 [0; 1] of job loss which
hurts both the worker and the firm as they take away employment/production opportunities. Job loss
is a random event that is not correlated with any parameters of the model. An individual will quit
the job if doing so increases the expected lifetime utility. The problem that an individual faces at t
under the discount rate r can be stated as maximizing the following function:
V(t) =
Z 1
t
exp ( r)yfedu;m()gd
where yfedu;m()g is net income in time  with labour market status m() a chosen education level
edu.
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We assume that matching becomes more ecient if an individual attains higher educational qual-
ification. This is because of two related but potentially separate reasons. First, with better schooling
comes with better presentation and a more matched focus, employers see the job candidate’s traits
more accurately, which makes them easier to hire. Secondly, higher educational qualification can
grant access to higher quality networks. A network is of superior quality if it shares the information
at a greater scale and speed, or with higher precision without much decay in informational contents.
Or one can expect that, with better educational qualification, one can expect the peer to be closer to
decision making positions of job applicants. This should give search eorts an extra eciency in
getting more oers. Thus even with the same information one sees between 1 and 2 except for e,
employability of 1 is greater with the larger signaling value e1 > e2.
We assume there are I > 0 types of individuals. Types dier in their match eciency ei , ei0 for
i0 , i, 8 i0 2 I. With match eciency ei, we redefine the matching function x˜() = ex() as in (3):
x˜(ui; vi) = eix(ui; vi) = eix

ui
vi
; 1

v = eix

 1i ; 1

vi
def
= eiq(i)vi; q0 < 0: (4)
Note that now all u and v are indexed with the type i, because dierent level of educational invest-
ments distinguishes dierent types of individuals.*2 Naturally, dierent values of e will result in
dierent values of . Note also that an (exogenous) increase in ei is purely welfare improving, better
for both individuals and firms.
2.4 Firms
In production, a worker contributes one unit of labour which gives an output of y. We assume
linear production technology, and each firm employs only one labourer. A firm can create a job to
enjoy the profit opportunities, and can keep the worker as long as it wishes and fire at will. But the
firms will keep on employing the same worker as much as they can, because we assume homogeneity
in worker productivity and there is a fixed cost  > 0 of creating a job which they must incurr had
they decided to switch to a new worker. This fixed cost acts like an entry barrier and leads to a
subsequent rent to be enjoyed.
The overall match for all firms becomes:
eq =
X
i2I
ieiq(i);
X
i2I
i = 1;
where i is proportion of type i workers.
*2 So the number of matches x should also be indexed by i as well, but we do not do so as we use x for a function x(),
and it may conflate with the notion that the functional form is also dierent.
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2.5 Contrasts with search intensity model
Note that there is a close parallel with Pissarides (2000, Chapter 5)’s model with endogenous
search intensity. In his model, an individual i can choose the “search units” si, which gives the
search volume of siu. The matching function then becomes:
x¨(su; v) = x¨

s uv ; 1

v def= q¨


s

v:

def
= vu ; q¨
0 < 0:
Under variable search intensity, the match arrival rate for the unemployed shows negative externality
of s, while it has positive impacts for match per vacancy.
x¨
v = q¨


s

; x¨su = q¨


s


s :
This captures that searching with more search units has negative externality. An increase in s is good
for firms but may not be good for individuals.
Contrasting two models may indicate:
 What changes: volume vs. eciency.
 Notion: wander more vs. communicate better.
 Welfare: umbiguous vs. no worse.
 Choice variables: flow vs. stock.
 Timing: Contemporaneous vs. childhood.
 u: umbiguous vs. reduces.
 w: reduces (?) vs. increases.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Equilibrium Bellman equations
Individuals and firms have two potential states, respectively. Namely, employed or unemployed,
and having a vacancy or a nonvacancy. These states have on going values represented by the fol-
lowing four Bellman equations. Following the literature, we assume firms incurr a fixed hiring cost
 > 0, there is a s 2 [0; 1] chance of a job being destroyed (job destruction rate), the unemployed
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receive unemployment benefits z > 0, firms produce y while paying a wage wi to the worker which
results in a profit y   wi, and individuals and firms discount the future with the factor r > 0.
Vacancy value JV :
rJV =   + eq

rJF   rJV

: (5)
Filled position value JF :*3
rJF = y   wi + (s + i)

rJV   rJF

; (6)
Note that e does not enter, because we assume that education has no productivity im-
pact.*4Unemployment value JU :
rJUi = z + ieiq(i)

rJEi   rJUi

: (7)
Employment value JE:
rJEi = wi + (s + i)

rJUi   rJEi

: (8)
A firm may not need to dierentiate wages across types, because they have the same productivity.
However, it is assumed that a firm bargains wages to all workers. This can dierentiate the wages
due to dierent relative bargaining positions. The population increases by i for each type. We
assume i diers across types. At each moment there will be i more workers, hence matches, for
type i. It reduces the value of filled positions by i. Firms can oer lower wages by citing the larger
number of applicants of the same type.*5
3.2 Individual choices in equilibrium
From (7) and (8):
rJEi =
(s + i)z + fr + ieiq(i)gwi
r + s + i + ieiq(i)
; (9)
rJUi =
(r + s + i)z + ieiq(i)wi
r + s + i + ieiq(i)
: (10)
Dierence is proportional to relative benefits of employment:
JEi   JUi =
wi   z
r + s + i + ieiq(i)
/ wi   z: (11)
*3 i is the rate of new labor market entries which reduces the asset value by i because of more filled positions.
*4
*5 A note on filled position value (6). I could have set i = 0 to keep things simpler.
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Note (9) and (10) can be written as:
rJEi = ai1z + (1   ai1)wi; (12)
rJUi = ai2z + (1   ai2)wi: (13)
with
ai1 =
s + i
r + s + i + ieiq(i)
<
r + s + i
r + s + i + ieiq(i)
= ai2:
wi > z shows that rJEi > rJ
U
i as it gives a larger weight on wi.
3.3 Educational investments
A rational student will invest up to e that maximizes net expected values when initial employment
probability is p:
ei = argmaxfpJEi + (1   p)JUi   c(ei)g;
= argmax

(r + s + i)z + ieiq(i)wi + p(wi   z)
  fr + s + i + ieiq(i)g c(ei)	;
= argmax fieiq(i)wi   fr + s + i + ieiq(i)g c(ei)g :
(14)
We assume that c(ei) is a convex cost function. FOC is:
iq(i) fwi   c(ei)g   fr + s + i + ieiq(i)g c0(ei) = 0 (15)
If p = p(ei) with p0 > 0, ei increases (with c() convex):
iq(i) fwi   c(ei)g + p0(ei)(wi   z)   fr + s + i + ieiq(i)g c0(ei) = 0 (16)
In either case, ei is increasing in wi, which is considered as an expected wage rate. It implies that
the higher the reservation wage, the longer the schooling they should acquire.
If c(e) = c(e; !) with @
2c
@e@! < 0, where ! is wealth, we get:
e = g(!); g0 > 0:
This assumption can be justified by the presence of a credit constraint, school (signal) quality / !,
geographical sorting: distance to jobs / 1
!
*6, network costs when e is a referral.
Usually, schooling is a discrete variable. Here, we assume e = e1; e2 with e1 is a matriculation
degree and e2 is an advanced degree. Then
9 ! 2 R++ s.t. !
(
6
>
! , e =
(
e1
e2
*6 This is not true in the US.
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3.4 Firm choices in equilibrium
Free entry of firms imply:
rJV = 0: (17)
We assume the generalized Nash barganing over matched rents. Given the bargaining power  2
(0; 1) of the individuals, this results in:
JEi   JUi =

1   

JF   JV

: (18)
Filled position value (6) can be writtenn as:
JF =
y   wi
r + s + i
:
Vacancy value (5) and free entry (17) give:
JF =

eq
; (19)
So
y   wi    r + s + ieq = 0: (20)
Job creation under free entry must yield a positive rent y   wi > 0 to recover the cost . wi is lower
if there are more new entrants i.
(9), (10), (23) give:
rJEi =
(s + i)z + fr + ieiq(i)g
n


y + i
eiqi
eq

+ (1   )z
o
r + s + i + ieiq(i)
; (21)
rJUi =
(r + s + i)z + ieiq(i)
n


y + i
eiqi
eq

+ (1   )z
o
r + s + i + ieiq(i)
: (22)
Note eq =
P
j  j jq( j). At  j = 0 for 8 j , i, rJEi is positve:
rJEi

 j=0
=
(s + i)z + fr + ieiq(i)g f (y + i) + (1   )zg
r + s + i + ieiq(i)
:
It can also be seen that:
@rJEi
@i
> 0:
We see if 2 > 1
rJE1

2=0
? rJE2

1=0
;
@ rJE2

1=0
@2
<
@ rJE1

2=0
@1
:
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Use a short hand dq = q(i) + iq0(i):
@rJEi
@i
=   fnumg
(denom)2
eidq +
ei
(denom)
"
fwageg dq
+ fr + ieiq(i)g
(
dq   iq(i)ieiq
0(i)
eq2
) #
=
eidq
(denom)2
"
  fnumg + (denom)fwageg
+ (denom)fr + ieiq(i)g
(
1   ii eiq(i)
eq2
q0(i)
dq
) #
:
The last term is positive. Comparing the 1st and 2nd terms and one can show:
 fnumg + (denom)fwageg = (s + i)
 
y + i
eiqi
eq
  z
!
> 0:
rJE2

1=0
rJE1

2=0
1
2
rJE2
rJE1
2
1
3.5 Steady state
(5), (6), (7), (8) and (17), (18) give:
wi = 
 
y + i
eiqi
eq
!
+ (1   )z: (23)
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So the higher the relative match eciency eiqieq , the higher the rent share. Looking at FOC in (15),
dei
dwi
> 0 and an increase in wi encourages investments in ei.
iq(i) fwi   c(ei)g   fr + s + i + ieiq(i)g c0(ei) = 0 (15)
Note the externality: If j , i invests more in e j, i’s rent share falls.
(7), (8) and (17), (18) give:
(r + s + i)(JEi   JUi ) = wi   rJUi ;
JEi   JUi = 1  JF ;
JF = 1r+s+i (y   wi)
So
wi = y + (1   )rJUi : (24)
(7), (18), (19) give:
yJUi = z + ieiq(i)

rJEi   rJUi

;
= z + ieiq(i)

1  J
F ;
= z + 1 i
eiqi
eq :
(25)
(24) and (25) give (23).
The steady state is characterised by the following equations. For signals:
iq(i) fwi   c(ei)g   fr + s + i + ieiq(i)g c0(ei) = 0 (15)
Job creation:
y   wi    r + s + ieq = 0: (20)
Wage:
wi = 
 
y + i
eiqi
eq
!
+ (1   )z: (23)
Beveridge curve:
ui =
s + i
s + i + ieiq(i)
(26)
Again, eq is a function of all i’s, so 4  I equations must be solved simultaneously.
Alternatively, the steady state is fui; vi; eig determined by:
iq(i)
(

 
y + i
eiqi
eq
!
+ (1   )z   c(ei)
)
  fr + s + i + ieiq(i)g c0(ei) = 0
(16)
(1   )(y   z)   
eq
fr + s + i   ieiq(i)g = 0: (27)
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ui =
s + i
s + i + ieiq(i)
(28)
Three unknowns ui, vi (or i = viui ), ei are solved with three equations provided that other types are in
an equlibrium.
For i = 1; 2, (23) and (20) give:
(1   )(y   z)   
eq
fr + s + i   ieiq(i)g = 0: (29)
This gives i. An equilibrium requires 1 and 2 to be determined simultaneously. (28), (29) give ui,
i (or vi). For i = 1; 2, it gives unique 1 < 

2.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we showed a model with one-sided endogenous match eciency. It is assumed that
schooling can enhance match eciency, and people will choose the schooling level optimally to bal-
ance its costs and benefits of enhanced match eciency. Assuming a financial market imperfection
which limits individuals to borrow, we showed that, in equilibrium, when educational achievements
can be characterised by dicohotomy (secondary vs. tertiary), tertiary education gives higher wages
even it only has pure match eciency (signalling) value with no human capital value. We also
showed that relative match eciency vis-a`-vis its mean matters in wage levels.
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